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Abstract
Quantum cognition in decision-making is a recent and rapidely growing field. In this
paper we develop an expected utility theory in a context of non-classical (quantum)
uncertainty. We replace the classical state space with a Hilbert space which allows
introducing the concept of quantum lottery. Within that framework we formulate
axioms on preferences over quantum lotteries to establish a representation theorem. We
show that demanding the consistency of choice behavior conditional on new information
is equivalent to the von Neuman-Lu¨ders postulate applied to beliefs. A dynamically
consistent quantum-like agent may violate dynamic recursive consistency, however.
This feature suggests interesting applications in behavioral economics as we illustrate
in an example of persuasion.
1 Introduction
Alternatives available in decision problems can often be analyzed in terms of a variety of
perspectives: a fur coat may be evaluated from an esthetical point of view or from the
point of view of animal suffering. A military intervention in Syria can be evaluated from a
geopolitical perspective or from a humanitarian one. Another type of example relates to the
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consumption of cigarettes: the immediate pleasure perspective contra the long term health
perspective. In order to assess an alternative we need to build a representation of it, a
”represented alternative” which is a mental construct1. Standard decision theory postulates
that we always are able to combine any relevant perspectives into a synthetic and stable
representation of the alternatives. However, it is also a common place for cognitive scientists
that we face difficulties when building our representation of a complex alternative. We
consider the alternative from different perspectives - one at a time. And most importantly
we are not always able to synthesize information from various perspectives into one single
coherent and stable representation of the alternative.
In this paper we are interested in decision-making under uncertainty and we want to
capture the difficulties people show in combining all relevant information by analogy with
incompatible properties in Quantum Mechanics. To many people it may appear unmoti-
vated or artificial to turn to quantum mechanics (QM) when investigating human behavioral
phenomena. However, the founders of QM, including Bohr and Heisenberg, were early to
recognize an essential similarity between the two fields:2 in both fields the object of investi-
gation cannot (always) be separated from the process of investigation. QM and in particular
its mathematical formalism was developed to respond to a general epistemological challenge:
how can one study an object that is being modified by the measurement of its properties?
This provides legitimacy to the exploration of the value of the mathematical formalism of
QM in the study of human behavioral phenomena without reference to Physics.3 Of partic-
ular interest in our context is that this formalism allows representing agents subject to the
incapacity to simultaneously consider a choice alternative from all relevant perspectives. For
instance when evaluating the ”animal suffering” value of a fur coat, its esthetical (subjec-
tive) value, that was well-determined in our decision-maker’s mind before considering animal
suffering aspects, may become ”blurred” i.e., uncertain.
The classical approach to decision-making under uncertainty e.g., in Savage (1972) and
1Kahneman and Tversky (2000) write “the true objects of evaluation are neither objects in the real world
nor verbal descriptions of those objects; they are mental representations” a conception which they further
write is entirely natural for cognitive scientists (p. xiv).
2In particular Bohr was influenced by the psychology and philosophy of knowledge of Harald Ho¨ffding
(see Bohr 1971 and the Introduction in Bitbol 2009 for an insightful discussion).
3The human mind behaves in a wide array of weird manners. It is not the weirdness of quantum mechanics
that makes it an attractive toolbox, but the fact that it is a most general paradigm for structural contextuality
(i.e., non-separability between the object of and the operation of investigation).
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Anscombe and Aumann (1963) builds on the notion of a state space S of states of nature.
Very roughly a representation of the world (a belief) corresponds to a probability distribution
on S. And the changes in beliefs following the acquisition of new information follow Bayes’
rule which can be given a behavioral foundation as shown in Ghirardato (2002) : Bayesian
updating secures dynamic consistency i.e., it secures that choices based on updated prefer-
ences are consistent with ex-ante preferences defined for the condition (event) that triggered
updating. There exists however massive evidence of violations of Bayes rule. One source of
violations is that measurements (in a broad sense) affect the object of measurement. Most
clearly this happens in quantum physics and it is the reason why some properties may be
incompatible. This is formally expressed in the non-commutativity of measurement opera-
tions which induces a non-Bayesian updating process. A related line of motivation appeals
to the growing interest for applications of elements of the mathematical formalism of Quan-
tum Mechanics to psychology, social sciences and in particular to decision-making (see e.g.,
Brandenburger and La Mura (2015), Khrennikov (2014) and Busemeyer and Bruza (2012)
for an overview of the field). The approach has shown successful in explaining a large vari-
ety of behavioral anomalies in decision-making ranging from cognitive dissonance, preference
reversal, conjunction fallacy, disjunction effects to framing effects.
In a recent book Akerlof and Schiller (2015) labelled a new term ”Phishing
equilibrium” to express how markets systematically exploits the manipulability
of real consumers with far reaching implications for the efficiency and welfare
properties of free markets. In a last section we suggest in a simple economic
example that quantum indeterminacy of beliefs implies a ”manipulability” of
economic agents much in line with Akerlof and Schiller’s empirical evidence
as well as with their understanding of the underlying psychological mechanism
”Just change people’s focus and one changes the decisions they make” (p.173).
In this article, we substitute the Boolean lattice of events with a more general lattice
of projectors in the Hilbert space as the suitable framework for modelling decision-making.
The notions are introduced progressively and require no previous knowledge of Quantum
Mechanics or Hilbert spaces. We show that a natural definition of a quantum lottery allows
for the formulation of decision theoretical axioms similar to the classical ones with one
exception. We need axiom A0 that secures the stability of preferences over lotteries defined
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over different perspectives (resolutions of the state space). This axiom (that we labelled ”no-
framing”) is trivially satisfied in the classical world (all lotteries can be expressed in a single
finest partition(resolution) of the state space). We next show that the von Neumann-Lu¨ders
projection postulate of Quantum Mechanics used as an updating rule is both necessary
and sufficient for dynamic consistency of preferences. In our context the von Neumann-
Lu¨ders postulate arises from purely behavioral considerations that is from a requirement of
consistency applying to conditional (on new information) preference relations. Interestingly,
the specificity of non-classical uncertainty (also referred to as ”contextuality”) is shown to
imply a failure of the so-called ”recursive dynamic consistency” (a dynamic version of the
Savage’s Sure Thing Principle). We use this result to show that quantum indeterminacy of
beliefs implies a significant ”manipulability” of consumers.
There exists a few earlier works addressing quantum probabilities in the context of
decision-making. These include Deutsch (1999), Pitowsky (2003), Lehrer and Shmaya (2006),
Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky (2010) and Gyntelberg and Hansen (2012)). In partic-
ular Pitowsky writes about ”betting on quantum measurements” but he is not working
with preference relations. Interestingly, he formulates a rule saying that the probability for
any specific outcome is independent of the specific measurement that yields it as one of its
possible results. This rule is very much in line with our axiom A0. Lehrer and Shmaya
propose a subjective approach to quantum probabilities but they do not work with quantum
lotteries. Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky develop an expected utility theory in a gen-
eral non-classical uncertainty context (ortho-modular lattices). A first distinction with the
present work is that instead of assuming the existence of a certainty equivalent, we build on
fundamentals which brings us closer to the approach of von Neumann and Morgenstein and
Aumann. We also adopt the structure of the Hilbert space which allows addressing more
general type of lotteries.4 These steps are necessary to develop the core contribution of the
paper which is related to the dynamics of beliefs and choices in response to new information
in a non-classical uncertainty environment. Gyltenberg and Hansen (2012) work with Hilbert
space to develop an expected utility theory with subjective events. Their static setting shows
4In Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky 2010, only direct measurement (orthogonal resolution
of the unit) were considered. In the present work we also address ”fuzzy” measurement by
means of POVM (positive operator valued measurements). In such a context an outcome is a
probability distribution over events.
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similarities with ours. However their analysis appeals to a large number of axioms - 12 where
we have 5 - and most importantly they do not address the issue of dynamic consistency.
The present work is a contribution to both decision theory and the foundations of quan-
tum cognition. We extend previous works in two directions. First, we provide a complete
characterization of expected utility theory under non-classical (quantum) uncertainty: a
concise formulation of sufficient and necessary axioms in terms of preferences over quantum
lotteries. Most importantly, this construction allows for a transparent characterization of
dynamic consistency of choice behavior in such an environment. Finally, we discuss the value
of the approach for economics and illustrate it with an example of ”Phishing for Phools”.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we introduce the concept of quantum lottery which
gives the opportunity to define basic elements of the mathematical formalism. In section
3 we provide a straightforward construction and a complete characterization of preferences
over quantum lotteries satisfying some standard properties. We formulate the corresponding
axioms and derive our representation theorem. In section 4 we address the issue of infor-
mation updating and formulate our central theorem of dynamic consistency. Thereafter we
discuss the value of our results in economics and end with some concluding remarks.
2 Quantum lotteries
We are interested in a decision-maker’s preferences over what we call quantum lotteries. In
this section we define the notion of quantum or Q-lottery. As for any lottery, the prize
that the DM obtains depends on the realization of some event which is the outcome of a
measurement, it is an uncertain payoff. And the lotteries described below (roulette, horse
and quantum lotteries) differ essentially in the type of measurement that is being performed.
Therefore we first need to clarify the meaning of measurement and in particular of a quantum
measurement. But we shall start by reminding basic facts about roulette lotteries and so
called ‘horse lotteries’.
Roulette lotteries
Hereafter we letX denote a set of prizes. A roulette lottery (with prizes inX) is defined by
a collection of prizes x1, ..., xr together with the probabilities p1, ..., pr (pi are non-negative
real numbers with
∑
i pi = 1) for obtaining the corresponding prize. Such a lottery can
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be written as the string l = (x1, p1; ...; xr, pr), but we prefer to write it as a formal sum
l =
∑
i xi ⊗ pi. We could think of it in the following way: a measurement in the form of a
‘roulette’ is performed and gives an outcome in the set {1, ..., r}. The probability of outcome
i is pi and, depending on the outcome of this ‘measurement’, a prize xi is paid.
Such lotteries can be identified with (simple) probabilistic measures on the set X . We
denote by ∆(X) the set of such measures (or lotteries). Under well-known conditions, von
Neumann and Morgenstern obtained that the utility of a lottery l =
∑
i xi ⊗ pi for the
decision-maker DM is given by a number U(l) =
∑
i piu(xi). Here u : X → R is a ‘utility
function’ defined on the set X of prizes.
Horse lotteries
The next concept is that of a ‘horse lottery’ (in the terminology of Anscombe and Au-
mann) or ‘act’ (in Savage’s terminology). A horse lottery is a mapping f : S → X from the
set S of ‘states of nature’ to the set X of prizes. A measurement is performed in the form
of a ‘horse race’ and, depending on the result of this measurement, the corresponding prize
is paid.
Again under suitable conditions the utility of a horse lottery f can be written as U(f) =
∑
s psu(f(s)), where u : X → R is again a utility function, and p is a (subjective) probability
measure on the set S. A considerable simplification of the conditions was achieved by
Anscombe and Aumann when taking roulette lotteries as prizes. They define a horse lottery
as a function L : S → ∆(X). A measurement defines the state s of nature, after that a
drawing of the lottery L(s) performs which gives a resulting prize.
In order to smoothly move over to quantum lotteries, it is convenient to present horse
lotteries slightly differently. We denote by l(s, x) the corresponding probabilities for realiza-
tion of outcomes x in the lottery L(s). Now we can form the functions Lx : S → R by the
rule Lx(s) = l(s, x). And rewrite our horse lottery L as
∑
x x ⊗ Lx. Here the function Lx
can be understood as a plausibility (or as a potentiality) of getting prize x.
Generally, a finite family (Li, i ∈ I) of functions Li on a set S is called a positive decom-
position of unit if all these functions Li are non-negative and their sum
∑
i Li is equal to
the function 1S identically equal to 1. One can understand such a family as a classical fuzzy
measurement device with the set I of outcomes; in a state s of nature this measurement
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gives the outcome i with probability Li(s). If we associate a prize xi to outcome i, we obtain
a horse lottery L =
∑
i xi ⊗ Li.
Quantum lotteries
A quantum lottery is also a bet on the outcome of a measurement, but now a quantum
one. A measurement of some ‘observable’ is performed, and, depending on the result ob-
tained, our DM receives some prize. To formalize the notion of quantum measurement we
have to modify the notion of a state space. The set S is replaced by some Hilbert space
H . The notion of function on S is replaced by the notion of Hermitian operator Below we
give precise definitions (a reminder of elementary notions about Hilbert spaces is provided
in Appendix 1). For now we only say that the main difference with the classical state space
model is that the Hilbert space model allows for measurements that cannot be performed
simultaneously i.e., they are incompatible with each other. Therefore the performance of a
measurement can modify the state of the system.
Quantum measurement
A quantum measurement device is modeled by a finite collection (Pi, i ∈ I) of Hermitian
operators such that
a) all Pi are nonnegative, and
b)
∑
i Pi = E.
In Physics such a collection is called POVM (positive operator valued measure); we
prefer to speak about positive decomposition of unit (PDU). The elements of I are the
possible outcomes of the device; the operators Pi express the potentiality for realization of
the outcome i in a way similar to the functions Lx for horse lotteries (see above).
We shall distinguish between two classes of measurements. The first one consists of von
Neumann measurements (they are known also as direct measurements, orthogonal measure-
ments, first kind measurements, and reproducible measurements). They are defined by the
requirement that the Pi are orthogonal each other, that is PiPj = 0 for i 6= j. It is easy to
see that in this case all operators Pi are projectors. Conversely, it can be shown that if all
Pi are projectors, they are orthogonal each other.
The second and broader class of measurements includes (Qi, i ∈ I) such that Qi commute
with each other, that is OiQj = QjQi for any i, j ∈ I. We call such measurements internally
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consistent. It is easy to see that orthogonal operators commute, so that von Neumann
measurements are internally consistent.
Examples of such measurements are ‘von Neumann measurements with noise’. We make
a von Neumann measurement (Pi, i ∈ I) (with orthogonal Pi) and after having obtained
an outcome i, we use a roulette lottery li with values in a set X to determine the final
outcome x. Such a measurement device is modeled by the collection (Qx, x ∈ X), where
Qx =
∑
i li(x)Pi. Conversely, any internally consistent measurement can be represented as
von Neumann measurement with noise.
An example of more general measurements is provided by the notion of a compound
measurement. Suppose we have two von Neumann measurements devices, P = (Pi, i ∈ I
and Q = (Qj , j ∈ J). Then we can form the compound measurement PQ with the set of
outcomes I × J : we perform first measurement P, then perform Q and write the obtained
outcomes (i, j). The corresponding PDU is (PiQjPi, i ∈ I, j ∈ J). If Pi commute with
Qj , PQ is von Neumann measurement as well. However in the general case, when P and
Q are incompatible, the obtained measurement PQ is not von Neumann measurement.
This construction is one of the justifications for considering non-orthogonal measurements.
Another line of justification relates to the possibility of defining mixtures and restrictions.
Quantum Lottery
As we already wrote, a quantum lottery is a bet on the outcome of a quantum mea-
surement. More precisely, a Q-lottery is a pair made of a quantum measurement device
P = (Pi, i ∈ I) (the base of the lottery) and the prizes associated with the corresponding
outcomes (xi, i ∈ I). We write such a Q-lottery as
∑
i xi⊗Pi. Intuitively the measurement
P is performed and depending on the outcome i that obtains, the agent receives prizes xi.
The set of Q-lotteries is denoted as QL(H).
A constant Q-lottery is a lottery of the form x⊗E; it gives the prize x with certainty.
Any Q-lottery σ =
∑
i xi ⊗ Pi can be written in the canonical form
∑
x x ⊗ Qx, where
Qx =
∑
i,xi=x
Pi.
5 Let QLc(H,X) be the set of canonical Q-lotteries (or simply QLc(H)
because the specification of the set X does not play an essential role). Intuitively, the initial
Q-lottery σ and its canonical form only differ in the way we write them and therefore can
5Although the set X can be infinite only a finite number of Qx differ from 0.
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be considered as equivalent. Below we formulate this equivalence as our ‘no-framing’ axiom
A0.
As it is the case for classical lotteries, we can define mixtures of Q-lotteries, but we
restrict the mixture operation to canonical lotteries. Suppose that we have two Q-lotteries
in the canonical form: σ =
∑
x x ⊗ Px and τ =
∑
x x ⊗ Qx. Then we can construct a new
canonical Q-lottery as the mixture of the two (with weights α and 1− α) ασ + (1− α)τ :=
∑
x x⊗(αPx+(1−α)Qx). The new lottery is interpreted as follows. First you use a ”roulette
device” to determine which one of σ or τ will be played and thereafter you play one of them.6
(For instance, if x∗ ∈ X is an outcome never paid by τ , then Qx∗ = 0 and ασ+(1−α)τ pays
x∗ under the event αPx∗.) The set QLc(H,X) of canonical Q-lotteries is a convex space. We
shall use this structure intensively in what follows.
3 Construction and characterization of ‘nice’ prefer-
ences
We are interested in preference relations over quantum lotteries that satisfy some ‘natural’
properties, familiar from von Neumann and Morgenstern, Savage, Aumann and others. We
call such preference relations ”nice”. We start with a straightforward construction of nice
preferences, thereafter we formulate their properties (axioms), and finally we show that these
properties fully characterize nice preferences.
In order to construct preferences (in fact, to construct the utility of Q-lotteries), we
should specify two things. First, a utility function u : X → R. Second, a linear ‘belief ’
functional β : Herm(H)→ R which is
a) positive in the sense that β (A) ≥ 0 for A ≥ 0,
b) normalized in the sense that β (E) = 1.
With these two ingredients, we can define the ‘(u, β)-utility’ U(σ) = Uu,β(σ) of any
6In the quantum case we do not in general have the equivalence - as in the classical case - with the
alternative interpretation of the mixture: play both lotteries and use the roulette device to select which
outcome determines the prize afterwards. This is because in the general case the two measurements implicit
in the lotteries need not be compatible.
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Q-lottery σ =
∑
i xi ⊗ Pi as
U(σ) =
∑
i
u(xi)β(Pi),
For Q-lotteries σ and τ we set σ  τ if U(σ) ≤ U(τ). Below we list some ‘nice’ properties
A0-A4 that this preference relation  on QL (H) possesses.
No framing
A0. For any σ, τ ∈ QL(H) with respective canonical forms σ′ and τ ′, σ  τ ⇔ σ′  τ ′.
Axiom A0 follows from the fact that the utility of a Q-lottery σ =
∑
i xi ⊗Pi is equal to
the utility of its canonical form
∑
x x⊗ (
∑
i,xi=x
Pi). Indeed, the utility of the latter is equal
to
∑
x u(x)β(
∑
i,xi=x
Pi) =
∑
x
∑
i,xi=x
u(xi)β(Pi) =
∑
i u(xi)β(Pi) = U(σ).
This axiom is implicit in the Savage and Anscombe-Aumann frameworks. However, in
generalizations of these frameworks it must be imposed explicitly see e.g., Cohen and Jaffray
(1980). They formulate an axiom of ‘non influence of formalization’ very similar to our
axiom A0. There are also other works that reject that axiom in order to allow for framing
effects see Ahn and Ergin (2010).
Weak order
A1. The preference relation  is a weak order, that is complete and transitive.
This follows from its representation via the utility U .
The next following two properties assert that the preference relation is consistent with a
mixture structure on the set QL(H).
Independence
A2. Let σ, τ, ϕ ∈ QLc(H) be Q-lotteries, and α ∈ [0, 1]. If σ  τ then ασ + (1 − α)ϕ 
ατ + (1− α)ϕ.
Property A2 follows from the linearity of β.
Continuity
A3. Let σ, τ, ϕ ∈ QLc(H), and σ ≺ ϕ ≺ τ . Then there exists α and β (0 < α, β < 1)
such that ασ + (1− α)τ ≺ ϕ and ϕ ≺ βσ + (1− β)τ .
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Indeed, since U(σ) < U(ϕ) < U(τ), we have U(ϕ) > αU(σ) + (1 − α)U(τ) for some
α ∈ (0, 1) and U(ϕ) < βU(σ)+(1−β)U(τ) for some β ∈ (0, 1). So U(ϕ) > U(ασ+(1−α)τ)
and U(ϕ) < U(βσ + (1− β)τ).
Monotonicity
This property is the most subtle. It asserts, roughly speaking, that if we in a lottery
σ =
∑
i xi ⊗ Pi replace the prizes xi with better ones then new lottery will be preferred to
the initial one. However, this formulation is too weak for our aims, and we formulate it in
stronger form. To do that we first note that we can define the canonical form not only for
‘prize valued Q-lotteries’ but also for ‘roulette valued Q-lotteries’, that is for expression of
the form
∑
i li ⊗ Pi, where li =
∑
x x ⊗ li(x) are roulette lotteries. The canonical form of
this lottery is
∑
x x ⊗ Qx, where Qx =
∑
i li(x)Pi. Let QL(H,∆(X)) denote the set of all
roulette-valued Q-lotteries. We use this to extend the preference relation to QL(H,∆(X))
as follows: for any σ, τ ∈ QL(H,∆(X)) with respective canonical form σ′ and τ ′, σ  τ
if and only if σ′  τ ′. We next have to consider the derived preference relation ∆ on the
set of ordinary (roulette) lotteries ∆(X). For roulette lotteries l and m we set l ∆ m if
l⊗E  m⊗E. Here l⊗E denotes a constant Q-lottery, getting with certainty the prize l,
and similarly for m⊗ E.
Note that the preference ∆ on ∆(X) is represented by the affine extension of u from
X to ∆(X), that we still denote by u. Indeed, we have U(l ⊗ E) = U(∑x x ⊗ l(x)E) =∑
x u(x)β(l(x)E) =
∑
x u(x)l(x) = u(l), because β(E) = 1.
A4. Let σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Pi and τ =
∑
imi ⊗ Pi be elements of QL(H,∆(X)) with the same
base. If li ∆ mi for any i ∈ I then σ  τ .
This property can be considered as a strong version of the sure-thing principle of Savage.
It is a simple consequence of the formula U(σ) =
∑
i u(li)β(Pi) and of the non-negativity of
β(Pi).
Definition 3. A preference relation  on the set QL(H) of Q-lotteries is nice if it has
the properties A0−A4 (or satisfies the axioms A0−A4).
The discussion above shows that a preference relation u,β built with the help of a utility
function u on X and a linear functional β on Herm(H) is nice. Our first result asserts that
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the reverse is also true.
Theorem 1. A preference relation  on QL(H) is nice if and only if there exist a
function u on X and a positive and normalized linear functional β on P(H) such that
=u,µ.
Moreover, if the preference  is not trivial (that is there exist Q-lotteries σ and τ such
that σ ≺ τ) then β is unique and u is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
The proof is in Appendix 2. We now briefly sketch this proof. First, fix a measurement
device P = (Pi, i ∈ I). In the first stage of the proof, we use the primitive preference 
on QL(H) to construct another preference P on the set QLP(H,∆(X)) of roulette-valued
Q-lotteries with base P. Viewing each such Q-lottery in QLP(H,∆(X)) as an Anscombe-
Aumann act from I to ∆(X), we invoke the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) theorem, and obtain a
utility function uP and a probability vector βP on I providing together a Subjective Expected
Utility (SEU) representation of P . In the second stage of the proof, we show that these
various SEU represetations are consistent with each other; that is, that the functions uP are
essentially independent of P and that the probability vectors βP arise from a single belief
functional β.
In a classical Anscombe-Aumann setup, it is straightforward to obtain the consistency of
the various SEU representations accross different partitions of the state space because acts
are directly defined as functions from the state space to the the roulette space. But suppose
now that an act is rather a structure (E1, l1; . . . ;En, ln) where (E1, . . . , En) is a partition
of the state space and (l1, . . . , ln) is a corresponding collection of lotteries on X . Such an
act induces a function
∑
i 1Eili. Under an additional axiom requiring two acts inducing
the same function to be always indifferent, again we can easily obtain the consistency of
the various SEU representations accross the various partitions of the state space. Comming
back at our nonclassical setup, it takes a very similar axiom, namely A0, to obtain the
consistency of the SEU representations (uP , βP),accross the various PDU. And from there the
full representation stated in Theorem 1 easily follows. We next investigate some consequences
of our result and some reformulations.
The shadow operator of a Q-lottery
Let  be a nice preference relation on Q-lotteries. We fix some function u from X
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to R. We call the shadow operator of a lottery σ =
∑
i xi ⊗ Pi the Hermitian operator
Sh(σ) = Shu(σ) defined as follows
Sh(σ) =
∑
i
u(xi)Pi.
We note that β(Sh(σ)) = U(σ), and consequently the utility of Q-lottery σ depends only on
its shadow operator. The notion of shadow operator is the equivalent of the notion of utility
profile in the classical framework. And in the same way the expected utility of an act only
depends on its utility profile. From here we could completely forget about Q-lotteries and
discuss the utility of Hermitian operators expressed by the functional β.
Trace and belief operator
There exists a remarkably useful way of representing the belief functional β by means of
a (Hermitian) operator of belief. For that we shall make extensive use of the concept of the
trace of an operator (and precisely here the finite dimensionality of H becomes important).
A reminder of the definition and properties of the trace is provided in Appendix 1. Of
particular value in our context are two properties: commutativity Tr(AB) = Tr(BA) and
the fact that the trace of any Hermitian operator is a real number.
Definition 4. We call a belief operator (or a cognitive state) any nonnegative Hermitian
operator with the trace equal to 1.
Given a belief operator B, we can define the functional β on Herm (H), setting β (A) =
Tr (AB) for any A ∈ Herm (H).
Lemma 1. 1) The functional β takes real values ;
2) β (A) ≥ 0 for A ≥ 0;
3) β (E) = 1.
Proof. See Lemma in Appendix 1. 
As a consequence, we obtain that the functional β built on the belief operator B is a belief
functional. Moreover any belief functional has such a form (for a unique belief operator B).
In fact the formula (A,B) = Tr (AB) gives a scalar product (and thereby also the structure of
an Euclidean space) on the real vector space Herm (H). Relying on well-known description
of linear functionals on Euclidean space, we have proved the following
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Theorem 1′. A preference relation  on QL(H) is nice if and only if there exist a
utility function u : X → R and a belief operator B such that  is represented by the function
σ 7→ Tr (Shu (σ)B) .
Moreover, if the preference  is not trivial (that is there exist Q-lotteries σ and τ such
that σ ≺ τ) then B is unique and u is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Remark. In quantum physics such belief operators are called ‘states’ or ‘density op-
erators’. We shall refer to them as simply ‘beliefs’ or ‘cognitive state’ because they allow
constructing subjective probabilities in a most suitable way. Indeed, let B be a belief opera-
tor; then, for any event P , βB(P ) = Tr(PB) is the subjective probability for event P when
the cognitive state is B.
Example 1. Assume that belief operator B is given as the projector P = Pe on a
one-dimensional subspace Ce ⊂ H, generated by a vector e of length 1 (that is (e, e) = 1; in
Physics such operators are called pure states). In other words, P (x) = (x, e)e. It is easy to
check that, for any Hermitian operator A (viewed as a Q-lottery), its utility U(A) is equal
to Tr(AP ) = (Ae, e). In other words, the quadratic form (Ae, e) gives the utility of lottery
A when the beliefs are represented by a pure state e.
Such beliefs correspond to a maximally precise (subjective) representation of the state of
measured system.7
Example 2. Let us now consider the opposite case, when DM has beliefs represented
by the operator B = E/ dimH . Such beliefs can be interpreted as ‘uniform uncertainty ’;
roughly speaking, the DM assigns equal probability to all states. The expected value of a lot-
tery A under such beliefs is U(A) = Tr(AE)/ dim(H) = Tr(A)/ dim(H) which corresponds
to the arithmetic average of the eigenvalues of operator A.
Note that whatever the beliefs B, the expected value of a lottery-operator A equals to
some convex combination of its eigenvalues.
7In the quantum context, a (pure) maximal information information state is not a complete information
as in the classical context. In a maximal information state any measurement that generates new information
leads to the loss of some other previously known information: the state changes.
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4 Updating
Suppose that beliefs of a DM are given by a belief operator B. That is, our decision-maker
believes that the state of the measured quantum system is B. Alternatively, her cognitive
state is such that she assigns probabilities to events according to B. This means the
following. We consider here events as subspaces of H, or as projectors. If P is a
projector then the probability of P (at the belief B) is equal to prob(P ) = Tr(PB).
Since P is a projector, we can rewritten the latter as Tr(PBP ). In the next section
we return to the interpretation of B. But for now suppose that she receives information of
relevance for the lotteries. This information may concern the prizes or be relative to the
system, the measurements of which determines the outcomes and the prizes. In the following
we restrict ourselves to the case when the value of the prizes does not change (and is given
by a fixed utility function u) and all new information concerns the measured system. For
instance, the DM (or someone else) performs some intermediate measurement and learns
as a result of the measurement that some event P occurred. It is almost obvious that her
beliefs and preferences on Q-lotteries should change, the question we ask in this section is
how should her preferences on quantum lotteries change after receiving that information?
In Quantum Mechanics, it is simply postulated that states change in accordance with the
von Neumann-Lu¨ders postulate. More precisely, a system that was in state B transits to the
state B′ = PBP/Tr(PBP ) as a result of performing a measurement that yields the event P .
The operator PBP is Hermitian and non-negative ((PBPv, v) = (BPv, Pv) ≥ 0 by force of
the nonnegativity of B). Thus, B′ is indeed a state. Here, we need to clarify why Tr(PBP )
is different from zero so we are allowed to divide by this number. As a matter of fact, we
understand Tr(PBP ) as the probability to discover event P in cognitive state B. Thus, by
analogy with standard Bayesian updating, the von Neumann-Lu¨ders postulate focuses on
cases where the state assigns a positive probability to event P . If the trace Tr(PBP ) were
equal to 0, that would mean that something happened which has zero probability, i.e. an
event that is considered impossible under belief B. That is, the beliefs of our DM captured
by the state B are simply incorrect and she has to update them in a more fundamental way.
We want to show that in quantum decision theory beliefs change in the same way. Clearly,
we have to make some assumptions. In order to determine which assumptions we need, we
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return for a minute to the behavior of a classical decision-maker. She has preference between
functions (acts) defined on the set S of states of nature; suppose that she learns in addition
that the true state lies in some subset T ⊆ S. It is quite natural to assume that her new
preference depends only on values of these functions on the subset T . That is, only on the
restriction of the various functions to T .
I. Information as events
We want to proceed with Q-lotteries in a way analogous to the classical case. We shall
assume that the new information comes from the performance of a projective measurement
and that the obtained result informs that event P has occurred. Here P is a projector on
subspace W . We have to define what we mean with the “restriction of a Q-lottery” on a
subspace W .
As a subspace of the Hilbert space H , W is also a Hilbert space. Given an Hermitian
operator A on H , one can consider the operator PA as an operator on W (v 7→ PA(v) for
v ∈ W ). To avoid a confusion, we denote operator PA, conceived as an operator on W , by
A|W and call it the restriction of A on W . First we note that A|W is an Hermitian operator
(as an operator on W , not on H). Indeed, if y, z ∈ W (and hence Py = y, Pz = z) then
(PAy, z) = (Ay, Pz) = (Ay, z) = (y, Az) = (Py,Az) = (y, PAz).
The same argument shows that A|W is a nonnegative operator on W provided A is nonneg-
ative. Note, finally, that P |W is the identity operator on W .
The above indicates how to define a restriction to subspace W of any Q-lottery. If
σ =
∑
i xi ⊗ Pi is a Q-lottery on H , then σ|W :=
∑
i xi ⊗ Pi|W is a Q-lottery on W . We
call σ|W the restriction of lottery σ to W . Clearly, Sh(σ|W ) = Sh(σ)|W .
Let us next turn to the problem of updating nice preferences. Suppose that  is a nice
preference relation on the setQL(H); due to Theorem 1′ it is given by some belief operatorB.
Suppose now that our DM receives information in the form of an event-subspace W ⊂ H (or
of an event-projector P ). The updated preference relation will be denoted as W . Following
Ghirardato (2002), we formulate two axioms connecting W and . The first one A5 is
’consequentialism’:
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A5 If σ and τ are Q-lotteries on H, and σ|W = τ |W , then σ and τ are equivalent with
respect to W .
To formulate the second axiom we need one more notion. We say that a projector P
is compatible with a Q-lottery σ =
∑
i xi ⊗ Pi if P commutes with every Pi. Now we can
formulate axiom A6 of compatible dynamic consistency:
A6 Suppose that lotteries σ and τ are compatible with P , and σ|W⊥ = τ |W⊥, then
σ W τ if and only if σ  τ .
Extending Ghirardato (2002) to the quantum context, we state the following
Theorem 2. Let  be a non-trivial nice preference given by a belief operator B, and
Tr(PBP ) > 0. Then
a) The preference relation W given by the belief operator Bup = PBP/Tr(PBP ) sat-
isfies axioms A5 and A6.
b) Conversely, if a preference relation W satisfies Axioms A1, A5 and A6, then it is
nice and it is given by the ‘updated’ belief operator Bup = PBP/Tr(PBP ).
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix 3. It generalizes the classical equivalence result
between Dynamic Consistency and Consequentialism on the one hand and Bayesian updating
on the other hand to our nonclassical setup. Its proof is similar to the classical one. Given
two classical Q-lotteries σ, τ ∈ QL(H), we construct two other Q-lotteries adW (σ), adW (τ) ∈
QLc(H) with the following properties:
(1) adW (σ)|W = σ|W and adW (τ)|W = τ |W ,
(2) adW (σ)|W⊥ = adW (τ)|W⊥.
That is, adW (σ) and adW (τ) agree onW with σ and τ respectively, while they agree with
each other on W⊥. Given Axioms A5 and A6, these two properties imply the equivalence
between σ W τ and adW (σ)  adW (τ) for any Q-lotteries σ and τ . In a classical setup, this
equivalence is essentially a form of Savage’s (1954) Sure Thing Principle. Actually, Savage
postulates a preference satisfying the Sure Thing Principle and defines conditional preference
through this equivalence. Moreover, we show that we can choose adW (σ) and adW (τ) such
that their shadow operators are respectively given by PSh(σ)P and PSh(τ)P . In classical
terms, this means that the ‘utility profiles’ induced by adW (σ) and adW (τ) are equal to
those of σ and τ on event W and equal to 0 otherwise. From there, it takes a little algebra
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and the uniqueness part of Theorem 1’ to conclude. We next discuss some corollaries of this
theorem.
Remark 1. We above assumed that the probability of the event P is non-zero. In the
opposite case the received information contradicts the initial beliefs. Consider now the case
when the probability of the event P (equal, as we know, to Tr(PBP )) is 1, that is our
DM is sure that event P must occur. Receiving information that P occurred she does not
learn anything and intuitively we expect her preferences to remain the same, which indeed
obtains:
Proposition 1. A distance between a prior B and the posterior Bup is O((1−Tr(PBP ))1/4).
In particular, if Tr(PBP ) = 1 then Bup = B. We prove Proposition 1 in Appendix 4.
Remark 2. Let us consider a situation when the initial (a priori) beliefs are maximally
precise, that is, they are given (as in Example 1) by a one-dimensional projector or, to put
it differently, B is a pure state. How does the DM update her beliefs as she receives new
information? We expect the updated state to be pure as well. This is true in the classical
context and this is true in the quantum case as well with a noticeable distinction that the
new pure state is generally not the same as the initial one.
Proposition 2. If a belief operator B is a one-dimensional projector then the updated
operator Bup is a one-dimensional projector as well.
Proof. The rank of operator PBP is less or equal to the rank of operator B, that is ≤ 1.
✷
The main difference with the classical situation is that the new state is generally different
from the initial one. Indeed, let our belief operator B be the projection on the line Ce, where
e is a normalized vector ((e, e) = 1). Such a projector B moves an arbitrary vector x to vector
(x, e)e. Then the operator PBP moves vector x to P ((Px, e)e) = (Px, e)P (e) = (x, Pe)Pe,
that is the projection (up to the multiplier (Pe, Pe)) on the line CPe. Thus the pure state
e is changed into another pure state Pe/
√
(Pe, Pe). The reader can see here the projection
postulate at work. We would like to add that the modification is smaller the closer the vector
e to the subspaceW associated with the projector P . That is the closerTr(PBP ) = (Pe, Pe)
to 1.
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Remark 3. Suppose that, after receiving information in the form of an event-projector P,
the DM receives yet some new piece of information in the form of an event-projector Q (which
does not contradict P ). Then (up to a factor) the state changes as B 7→ PBP 7→ QPBPQ.
However, in the case when events-projectors do not commute with each other, the updated
beliefs depend on the order in which the updating is realized. Manipulating the order in
which information is provided affects our DM preferences and thus her choice behavior.
As we shall see later, together with Remark 2, Remark 3 paves the ground for interesting
economic implications.
Remark 4. Above we assume that the information comes in the form of an event, that
is a subspace W or a projector P . However we could consider the more general case when
the information has the form a ‘fuzzy-projector’, that is an Hermitian operator P such that
0 ≤ P ≤ E. In this case the updating of the belief take the form Bup = √PB√P/Tr(PB).
Proposition 1 generalizes to this setting; see Appendix 4.
II. Information as measurements
In the remaining of the paper we use the ‘shadow operator’ expression for lotteries:
A = Shu(σ). Due to Theorem 1′, the utility of such a lottery under belief B is equal to
U (A) = Tr(AB).
Usually, new information arises as an outcome of some measurement. Suppose we perform
some von Neumann measurement, represented by an orthogonal decomposition of unit, ODU
(Pi, i ∈ I). If, as the result of this measurement, we obtain outcome i, the belief-state B
changes (is updated) into Bi = PiDPi/Tr(PiB). We say that the state of the system transits
into subspace W = Im(Pi). Note that the number pi = Tr(PiB) is precisely the probability
(under the belief B) for the realization of outcome i when performing our measurement.
Excluding impossible results, we can assume that these numbers are stricty positive.
The utility of ‘lottery’ A, after the DM received information about realization of outcome
i, is now equal to Ui (A) = Tr(ABi). It may clearly be either larger or smaller than the
initial U(A).
Further we discuss an interesting case when such an ‘informational’ measurement has
been performed (using ODU P = (Pi, i ∈ I)), but its outcome is not known to the DM,
i.e., she only knows that the measurement took place. This is a new type of information;
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in Physics one speaks about ‘decoherence’. It is a fully non-classical phenomenon, because
in the classical situation such an ‘information’ is useless. This is not the case in a quantum
context.
We earlier established that when learning about the occurrence of an outcome i, the
utility of the lottery-operator A is updated to Ui(A) = Tr(ABi) (where B is the belief of
our DM, and Bi = PiBPi/Tr(PiB)) that is equal to Tr(APiBPi)/pi. Since the probability
of outcome i is pi, then the expected utility of our lottery U
′(A) (when learning about the
performance of measurement P) is
U ′(A) =
∑
i
piUi(A) =
∑
i
Tr(APiBPi).
(Of course, this means also that the state of belief B has changed into a new state B′ =
∑
i PiBPi). And, as we shall see, the connection between these two utilities, i.e. ex-ante
U(A) and ex-post U ′(A), is not straightforward in general. Ex-post utility can be either
larger or smaller than the initial (a priori) utility as the following simple example shows.
Example 3. Let H be a two dimensional Hilbert space with orthonormal basis (e1, e2).
Let A be a projector on e1, i.e., an operator of the form A =

1 0
0 0

 . Consider A as a lottery
that gives a utility equal to 1 in state e1 and 0 otherwise. Consider another lottery-operator
C =

0 0
0 1

 that gives utility 1 in state e2 and 0 otherwise. Assume now that our DM’s
belief-state is given by B = A. Then clearly the expected utility of lottery A is equal to 1
and the expected utility of C is equal to zero. So our DM strictly prefers A to C.
Assume now that we perform a measurement defined by the ODU (P1, P2), where P1 =
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2

 and P2 =

 1/2 −1/2
−1/2 1/2

 . If the outcome of the measurement is 1, the updated
belief-state is given by operator B1 = P1BP1/Tr (P1BP1) , which as can be seen easily is
equal to P1. The expected utility in the belief-state is U1 (A) = Tr(AB1) = Tr(AP1) =
1/2. And similarly if we obtain the complementary result 2, the belief-state is updated to
B2 = P2BP2/Tr(P2BP2) and the corresponding expected utility is U2 (A) = Tr(AB2) =
Tr(AP2) = 1/2. So we see that for any one of the two possible outcomes the value of the A
lottery goes from 1 to 1/2. With the same reasoning we obtain that U1 (B) = Tr(CB1) =
Tr(CP1) = 1/2 = U1 (C) . So the two lotteries A and C yield the same expected utility. This
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violates ”recursive dynamic consistency”: lottery A is ex-post indifferent to C whatever the
outcome of the measurement, yet ex-ante it is strictly preferred. Note that the intermediary
measurement (P1, P2) is incompatible with either A or C and B.
It may seem odd that our dynamic consistency axiom A6 allows for such departures. But
the appeal of recursive dynamic consistency is based upon the implicit assumption that ”the
act the agent performs has no effect on the resolution of uncertainty” (cf. Fishburn, 1970).
However, the resolution of uncertainty is - in our setting - affected by the act that is selected
and the measurements it entails (as well as by other measurements) performed to acquire new
information. Once this is taken into account, recursive dynamic consistency loses much of its
appeal. In the next section we discuss an economic example of the phenomenon exhibited
above and establish its connection with the behavior documented in the ”Economics of
Manipulation and Deception” (Akerlof and Schiller, 2015).
Example 3 allows illustrating ‘information as measurements’ a feature that lacks counter-
part in the classical model. Imagine that we perform the measurement described above but
our DM is not informed of the result. She only knows the measurement has been made.
In the classical world such an information does not affect the DM’s belief or the expected
value of the lotteries. However in the quantum context the DM understands that for any
of the two outcome (1 or 2) the expected value of lottery A has changed from 1 to 1/2.
Therefore, independently of her (lack of) knowledge about the outcome of the measurement,
she will revise her belief-state only because she knows that this specific measurement has
been performed. The new belief-state is B′ = p1B1 + p2B2 = E/2 which corresponds to
‘uniform ignorance’. And in this belief-state the expected utility of lottery A is equal to
Tr(AB′) = Tr(AE)/2 = 1/2. ✷
There are two interesting cases when decoherence (that is a measurement with unknown
outcome) does not change the utility of a lottery or the state of belief. These are cases when
the measurement P is compatible either with the lottery A or with the belief B, i.e. when
all the projectors Pi, i ∈ I, commute either with operator A or with operator B.
Proposition 3. Assume that the intermediate measurement is compatible with either
operator A or B. Then U(A) = U ′(A).
Proof. U ′(A) =
∑
iTr(APiBPi) =
∑
iTr(PiAPiB). Suppose that PiA = APi. Then the
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second sum can be rewritten as
∑
Tr(PiPiAB) =
∑
Tr(PiAB) = Tr((
∑
Pi)AB) = Tr(AB) = U(A).
Suppose now that PiB = BPi. Then the first sum can be rewritten as
∑
Tr(APiPiB) =
∑
Tr(APiB) = Tr(A(
∑
Pi)B) = Tr(AB) = U(A). 
Remark 5. Decoherence always changes state of belief toward a more dispersed one.
One can give to this statement an exact sense, using notions from the book of Alberti and
Uhlmann ”Stochasticity and partial order”, 1982. Here we would like to illustrate this by an
example when initial state is pure, presented by a (normalized) vector e. As we see from the
formula above (for updating the belief operator), the updated state is a probability mixture
(with weights pi) of pure states corresponding to the projections of e on the subspaces Wi.
That is a pure (coherent) state disintegrates (decoheres) into a mixture of pure states.
5 Quantum Cognition in Economics
In this section we discuss the possible value of our results for behavioral economics. We
start with a few words about quantum cognition. We know that in order to assess the
world we build a representation of it, a ”represented world” which is a mental construct. In
classical standard theory, the represented world reflects our incomplete knowledge about the
world expressed in our beliefs and these beliefs (should) evolve according to Bayes’ rule in
response to new information. Quantum cognition has been developed under the last decades
as alternative approach to incorporate two observations: 1. People have difficulties to build
a representations of a complex object. What people do is to consider a complex object from
different perspectives - one at a time; 2. People may be unable to combine perspectives
i.e., to synthesize all relevant information into one stable representation of the complex
object. Quantum cognition models the incapacity to combine some pieces of information
by analogy with incompatible properties (also called ”Bohr complementary”) in Quantum
Mechanics: different properties may be incompatible in the sense that they cannot be given
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a determinate value simultaneously (cf speed and position) but they complement each other
in the description of the system. Similarly different perspectives on an alternative may be
incompatible in the mind in the sense that the individual cannot have a clear stand with
respect to them simultaneously (i.e., combine them in a single coherent stable picture) but
the different perspectives contribute to characterizing the alternative.
In the present paper, we have extended decision theory to a non-classical uncertainty
environment. An interpretation of this move corresponds to proposing that the ”represented
world” used to evaluate lotteries exhibits quantum-like properties. In other words quantum
indeterminacy of beliefs captures the above mentioned cognitive limitations. Our results
with respect to dynamic consistency shed new light on observed behavioral anomalies in the
spirit of Shiller (2000) and Akerlof and Shiller (2015) who write : ”In our thoughts, as in
our conversation, our minds may change. It is not just that we acquire new ”information”;
we change our point of view and we interpret information in a new way. Importantly these
evolutions of our thoughts mean that our opinions, and the decisions that are based on
them, may be quite inconsistent”(p.45). We next provide an example showing how quantum
indeterminacy of beliefs and in particular its dynamic properties illustrated in Example 3
above delivers the kind of manipulability at the core of Phishing for Phools.
Consider a seller who wants to sell a new smartphone at price 300$ and a customer consid-
ering buying one. Initially, the customer holds beliefs about the quality of the smartphone
that can be either Excellent (utility 600) or Standard (utility 100). Her initial cognitive
state assigns subjective probabilities 0.25 and 0.75 respectively to the two possible events
so the expected utility is EU(S) = .25 · 600 + .75 · 100 = 225. The alternative is to keep
the money which has utility 300. So initially the customer does not want to buy the new
smartphone since 225 < 300. Now the seller engages in a conversation about the use of the
new smartphone among famous people. In so doing the customer is moved from a private
user perspective on the smartphone to a ”glamour” perspective (also with two outcomes:
glamour, not glamour). Assume that the two perspectives are incompatible in the mind.
Now what counts to our consumer is her idol Beyonce´, so she asks whether Beyonce´ uses
that smartphone. The seller answers truthfully either yes or no. After the conversation the
consumer updates her beliefs, her cognitive state is modified.8 Consider for simplicity the
8One possible interpretation is when in the ”glamour” perspective, she is (possibly uncon-
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case when private use and glamour perspectives are totally uncorrelated (the correspond-
ing bases are 45◦ rotations of each other - see the figure below). As she turns back to the
question whether or not to buy the smartphone, the lottery with updated beliefs yields
EU(S) = .5 ·600+ .5 ·100 = 400 > 300 whether she learned that the smartphone is glamour
or not (and her cognitive state is projected onto the corresponding axis):”the phool has been
phished” i.e., the seller exploited the quantum indeterminacy of the consumer’s ”represented
smartphone” (that is her beliefs and her consistent updating rule when evaluating the lot-
tery) to change her preferences so she chooses to purchase the smartphone. Quoting Akerlof
and Shiller again ” Just change people focus and you can change the decisions they make”
(p. 173).
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The idea of the Phishing equilibrium is that opportunities for manipulations will be
exploited whenever that is profitable. By recasting the standard approach into non-classical
uncertainty our theory can provide a rigorous setting for investigating the properties of
competitive markets with manipulable consumers.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we provided a fully consistent choice theory integrating cognitive limitations
affecting our capacity to build representations of choice alternatives. We found that the
mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics offers a suitable framework for modeling
such cognitive limitations. We fully characterize the rules for consistent choice behavior in
a non-classical uncertainty environment. A concept of quantum lottery is introduced and
sciuosly) reminded of the general disconnect between what is temporarily ”fashionable” and
fundamental user values of commodities.
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sufficient and necessary conditions for choice behavior to be representable by an expected
utility function are formulated in a most general setting. We also derive, from behavioral
principles, an updating rule that secures the dynamic consistency of the preference relation
as the decision-maker learns new information.
We found that most of the classical axioms of decision theory carry over to the context
of quantum lotteries. This is because all but one axiom can be formulated in terms of a
single orthogonal decomposition of the state space. When considering a single orthogonal
decomposition, quantum lotteries operating in the Hilbert space are equivalent to roulette
lotteries in a classical state space. An additional axiom is required to secure that the prob-
ability for any specific event does not depend on the particular lottery that it belongs to.
The necessity to impose that axiom stems from the fact that while it is trivially true in the
classical world, it is not necessary so in our general setting.
A most interesting result is that the von Neumann-Lu¨ders postulate which is central to
Quantum Mechanics and informs about the impact of a measurement on the state of a system
can be derived from a consistency requirement on choice behavior. When the belief-state
(cognitive state) is updated according to the postulate, the agent conditional preferences
reflect a single preference order. Of particular interest for behavioral economics is that in
contrast with classical subjective expected utility theory, dynamic consistency of preferences
does not entail the so-called recursive dynamic consistency. This is an expression of the
fundamental distinction between the two settings namely that the resolution of uncertainty
depends on the operation(s) performed to resolve it. We suggest that this very feature
makes our theory an attractive candidate to develop ”The Economics of Manipulation and
Deception” called for by Akerlof and Shiller.
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Appendix 1. Elementary facts about Hilbert spaces
Hilbert space
Let R and C denote the fields of real and of complex numbers. For a complex number z,
z¯ denotes the complex conjugate number.
Definition 1. Let H be a vector space over the field C. An Hermitian form on H is a
mapping (., .) : H×H → C such that: a) it is linear in the first argument; b) (v, w) = (w, v)
for any v, w ∈ H (in particular, (v, v) is a real number); c) (v, v) ≥ 0 for any v ∈ H , and
(v, v) = 0 only for v = 0.
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Vectors v and w are called orthogonal if (v, w) = 0; in this case (w, v) = 0 as well.
A Hilbert space is a vector space H endowed with a Hermitian form, which is complete
relatively to the norm |v| =√(v, v). In order to avoid unnecessary difficulties and subtleties
we assume further that H has finite dimension; then H automatically is complete.
When discussing lotteries and measurements we shall not be dealing so much with vectors
in H as with special operators (linear mappings from H to H) called Hermitian operators.
Hermitian operators
Definition 2. A linear operator A : H → H is called Hermitian, if (Av, w) = (v, Aw)
for any v, w ∈ H .
Clearly (Av, v) is a real number for any v ∈ H . Hermitian operatorA is called nonnegative
if (Av, v) ≥ 0 for any v. For Hermitian operators A and B we write A ≥ B if A − B is
nonnegative. The identity operator E (Ev = v for every v ∈ H) is Hermitian.
A most important, for the purpose of this work, class of Hermitian operator consists
of projectors. A projector is an idempotent Hermitian operator, that is PP = P . Since
(Pv, v) = (PPv, v) = (Pv, Pv) ≥ 0, any projector is nonnegative. Each projector P define
a vector subspace V = ImP ⊂ H , consisting of vectors v such that with Pv = v. The kernel
of the projector consists of vectors orthogonal to V , KerP = V ⊥. The set of projectors can
be identify with the set of (closed) subspaces of H .
Any linear combination of Hermitian operators with real coefficients is an Hermitian
operator. In other words, the set Herm(H) of Hermitian operators is a real vector space.
The crucial importance of projectors is underlined by the following important theorem.
Spectral theorem. Let A be a Hermitian operator. Then there exists a family of
projectors Pi and real numbers ai such that: 1) PiPj = 0 for i 6= j, 2)
∑
i Pi = E, and 3)
A =
∑
i aiPi.
In other words, in some orthogonal basis the operator A can be represented by a diagonal
matrix (with real coefficients). The coefficients ai are eigenvalues of the operator A. The set
of numbers ai is called the spectrum of the operator A. Clearly A is nonnegative if and only
if all coefficients ai are nonnegative. An operator A is a projector if and only if its spectrum
SpecA consists of 0 or 1.
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Each nonnegative operator A has a (unique) nonnegative square root
√
A (or A1/2, such
that (
√
A)2 = A). If A =
∑
i aiPi is a spectral representation of A then
√
A =
∑
i
√
aiPi.
Trace of operators
For arbitrary (not necessarily Hermitian) linear operator A : H → H it is possible to
talk about its trace Tr (A). More precisely, for any quadratic matrix A = (aij), the trace
Tr(A) is defined as
∑
i aii, the sum of its diagonal elements. A remarkable property of the
trace is its ‘commutativity’: Tr(AB) = Tr(BA) for any quadratic matrix A and B. This in
particular implies that the trace of an operator is independent of the choice of basis, thereby
allowing for an unambiguous definition of the trace of a linear operator.
For example, Tr(E) = dimH . More general, if P is an (orthogonal) projector (on
subspace V = ImP ) then Tr(P ) = dimV . Due to the spectral theorem, we obtain that the
trace of Hermitian operator A =
∑
aiPi is equal to
∑
airk(Pi) and, in particular, it is a
real number. The trace of nonnegative operator A is nonnegative and is strictly positive if
A 6= 0.
For two Hermitian operators A and B define (A,B)Herm = Tr(AB). We assert that this
‘scalar product’ gives a structure of Euclidean space on the real vector space Herm(H).
This follows from Lemma below.
Lemma. a) (A,B)Herm is a real number ;
b) (A,B)Herm = (B,A)Herm;
c) (A,A)Herm ≥ 0 and is equal to 0 only if A = 0.
Proof. Due to the ‘commutativity’ of the trace, 2Tr(AB) = Tr(AB) + Tr(BA) =
Tr(AB +BA). It is easy to understand that the operator AB +BA is Hermitian, hence its
trace is real. This proves a).
b) follows from the ‘commutativity’ of the trace.
c) follows from the nonnegativity of the operator A2. ✷
Appendix 2. Proof of Theorem 1
Let  be a nice preference relation on the set QL(H). We shall be working with roulette-
valued Q-lotteries, that is with expressions of the form
∑
i li ⊗ Pi, where (Pi, i ∈ I) is a
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PDU, and (li, i ∈ I) is a collection of roulette lotteries on X . Let QLP(H,∆(X)) denote the
set of all roulette valued Q-lotteries with base P. We first provide a result that shows that
mixtures of canonical Q-lotteries in QL(H) and mixtures of Q-lotteries in QLP(H,∆(X))
are compatible.
Consider a lottery in the canonnical form σ =
∑
x x⊗Px, where x ∈ X,Px are nonnegative
Hermitian operators which add up to E,
∑
x Px = E. The mixture ασ + (1− α) τ, where
τ =
∑
x x ⊗ Qx and α ∈ [0, 1], is given as
∑
x x ⊗ (αPx + (1− α)Qx) . On the other hand
a roulette valued Q-lottery writes σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Pi, where P = (Pi, i ∈ I) is a measurement
device (the base of the lottery) and li ∈ ∆(X) . A mixture of such lotteries is defined by the
following formula: ασ+ (1−α)τ =∑i (αli + (1− α) ri)Pi, where τ =
∑
i ri⊗Pi is another
Q-lottery in QLP(H,∆(X)) and α ∈ [0, 1].
We next define the canonisation mapping can : QLP → QLc, which maps lottery
∑
i li⊗
Pi (where the roulette lottery li has the form
∑
x x⊗li (x) i.e., li gives value x with probability
li (x)) into the canonical lottery
∑
x x⊗ (
∑
i li (x)Pi) .
Lemma 2. The mapping can preserves the operation of mixture; that is, for any
σ, τ ∈ QLP(H,∆(X)) and α ∈ [0, 1], can(ασ + (1− α) τ) = αcan (σ) + (1− α) can (τ).
Proof. Assume we have two P−based lotteries σ = ∑i li ⊗ Pi and τ =
∑
i ri ⊗ Pi and
some α ∈ [0, 1] . We want to show that can(ασ + (1− α) τ) = αcan (σ) + (1− α) can (τ) .
The left hand side is equal to can (
∑
i (αli + (1− α) ri)⊗ Pi) =∑
x x⊗
∑
i (αli + (1− α) ri) (x)Pi =
∑
x x⊗
∑
i (αli (x) + (1− α) ri (x))Pi =
=
∑
x x⊗
∑
i (α
∑
i li (x) + (1− α)
∑
i ri (x))Pi.
The right hand side is α
∑
x x⊗ (
∑
i li (x)Pi) + (1− α) (
∑
x x⊗
∑
i ri (x)Pi)
= αcan (σ) + (1− α) can (τ). ✷
Returning to the proof of Theorem 1, let ∆ denote the derived preference relation on
the set ∆(X) of roulette lotteries. The assertion of the theorem is true if the preference  is
trivial. Indeed, we can take u to be a constant and take an arbitrary functional β. So, from
now on, we assume that the preference  is nontrivial. That is τ ≺ σ for some Q-lotteries
σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Pi and τ =
∑
jmj ⊗Qj .
Claim 0. Let l∗ be the best lottery among (li) with respect to the derived weak order ∆.
Then σ  l∗ ⊗E.
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Proof. Consider the ‘constant’ lottery σ∗ =
∑
i l
∗ ⊗ Pi. Due to A4, σ  σ∗. Due to A0,
σ∗ ≈ l∗ ⊗ E. Due to transitivity of  (see A1) we conclude that σ  l∗ ⊗ E. ✷
Corollary 1. The derived preference ∆ is non-trivial, that is l∗ ≺∆ l∗ for some ordinary
lotteries l∗ and l
∗.
Proof. Indeed, if m∗ ia the worst lottery among (mj), then we have
m∗ ⊗ E  τ ≺ σ  l∗ ⊗E,
whence m∗ ≺∆ l∗. ✷
We fix such lotteries l∗ ≺∆ l∗; a function u : ∆(X) → R is said to be normalized if
u(l∗) = 0 and u(l
∗) = 1.
Fix now some measurement device P = (Pi, i ∈ I), and let QLP(H,∆(X)) denote
the set of all roulette valued Q-lotteries with base P. We first extend  into a preference
relation P defined on QLP(H,∆(X)) by setting σ  τ if and only if can(σ)  can(τ) for
any σ, τ ∈ QLP(H,∆(X)).
Claim 1. There exists a normalized affine function uP on ∆(X) and a function βP
on the set of outcomes I (βP(i) ≥ 0 and
∑
i βP(i) = 1) such that the preference P is
represented by the function UP , UP(
∑
i li⊗Pi) =
∑
i uP(li)βP(i). Moreover, both uP and βP
are unique.
Proof. Each Q-lottery σ =
∑
i li⊗Pi can be considered as a ‘horse’ lottery f : I → ∆(X),
where f(i) = li. Moreover, due to axioms A1-A4 and Lemma 2, the relation P satisfies all
the Anscombe-Aumann axioms. Therefore, by theorem 13.2 in Fishburn (1970), we obtain
an affine utility function uP on ∆(X) and a probability measure βP ∈ ∆(I) that achive the
representation stated in Claim 1. The uniqueness of βP is also given by this theorem. The
uniqueness of uP follows from normalization of uP . ✷
Claim 2. The functions uP are independent of P (and we denote them as u).
Proof. Due to A0, each of the functions uP represents the derived preference ∆ on
∆(X). Therefore they are positive affine transformations of each other. Normalization gives
that they are in fact equal to each other. ✷
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Claim 3. For any Q-lottery σ, there exists an ordinary lottery l ∈ ∆(X) such that σ is
equivalent to l, that is σ ≈ l ⊗ E.
Proof. Let σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Pi, and lb (correspondingly, lw) is a best (corresp., a worst)
lotteries among (li, i ∈ I). Due to A4, we have
∑
i l
w ⊗ Pi  σ 
∑
i l
b ⊗ Pi, and all these
Q-lotteries have the same base P = (Pi, i ∈ I). Therefore we can apply Claim 1, which gives
inequalities
u(lw) ≤
∑
i
u(li)βP(i) ≤ u(lb).
Hence
∑
i u(li)βP(i) = αu(l
w) + (1−α)u(lb) = u(l) for some α ∈ [0, 1], where l = αlw+ (1−
α)lb. By Claim 1, we have σ ≈∑i l ⊗ Pi ≈ l ⊗ E. ✷
Due to Claim 1, the function UP allows to compare Q-lotteries with base P. But we
assert that it allows to compare Q-lotteries with different bases as well.
Claim 4. Let σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Pi be a Q-lottery with a base P = (Pi, i ∈ I), and let
τ =
∑
jmj ⊗ Qj be a Q-lottery with a base Q = (Qj , j ∈ J). Then σ  τ if and only if
UP(σ) ≤ UQ(τ).
Proof. Due to Claim 3, the lottery σ is equivalent to some lottery l⊗E, or to the lottery
∑
i l ⊗ Pi. Therefore, UP(σ) = UP(
∑
i l ⊗ Pi) = u(l). Similarly, τ is equivalent to m ⊗ E,
and UQ(τ) = u(m). Now
σ  τ ⇔ l ⊗E  m⊗E ⇔ UP(σ) = u(l) ≤ u(m) = UQ(τ). ✷
Let us return now to the functions βP . We assert that βP(i) depends only on the operator
Pi, not of P and i.
Claim 5. Let P = (P1, ..., Pn) and Q = (Q1, ...Qk) be two measurement devices (bases),
and P1 = Q1 = R. Then βP(1) = βQ(1).
Proof. Consider Q-lottery σ = l∗ ⊗ P1 +
∑n
i=2 l∗ ⊗ Pi with base P. Its P-utility UP(σ)
is equal to βP(1). Now let us form the auxiliary base R = (R,E − R) and the following
Q-lottery ρ = l∗ ⊗ R + l∗(E − R). Since E − R = P2 + ... + Pn, the lottery ρ is equivalent
to σ (see Axiom A0). Therefore R-utility UR(ρ) (which equals βR(1)) is, by Claim 4, equal
to βP(1). The same applies to Q and gives the equality βR(1) = βQ(1). Together with the
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equality βR(1) = βP(1) we obtain the equality βP(1) = βQ(1). ✷
As a consequence, we can speak about the number β(P ) for any ‘event’ P , that is for
any hermitian operator P , 0 ≤ P ≤ E. β(P ) is R-utility UR of the following Q-lottery
l∗ ⊗ P + l∗ ⊗ (E − P ). Correspondingly, the utility of an arbitrary Q-lottery σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Pi
can be rewritten as
U(σ) =
∑
i
u(li)β(Pi).
Obviously, β(0) = 0 and β(E) = 1. Moreover, β(P ) ≥ 0 for any ‘event’ P , and
∑
i β(Pi) = 1 provided
∑
i Pi = E.
Claim 6. If 0 ≤ P , 0 ≤ Q, and P +Q ≤ E, then β(P +Q) = β(P ) + β(Q).
Proof. Indeed, consider the Q-lottery l∗ ⊗ P + l∗ ⊗ Q + l∗ ⊗ (E − P − Q). Its utility
is β(P ) + β(Q). On the other hand, due to A0, this lottery is equivalent to the lottery
l∗ ⊗ (P +Q) + l∗ ⊗ (E − P −Q), whose utility is β(P +Q). ✷
Claim 6 implies that β can be extended to a (unique) linear functional β on the vector
space Herm(H). Obviously, β(A) ≥ 0 for A ≥ 0, and β(E) = 1. That is β is a belief
functional. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Appendix 3. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Assertion a). Here we can work with lotteries in the form of Hermitian operators.
Utility U(A) of such an operator A is equal to Tr(AB) and utility under the condition P is
equal to U(A|P ) = Tr(APBP ) (up to the factor Tr(PBP )).
Proving property A5. We assume that A|W = 0 and have to show that U(A|P ) = 0.
Note that A|P = 0 is equivalent to PAP = 0. Now U(A|P ) = Tr(APBP ) = Tr(PAPB) =
Tr(0B) = 0.
Proving property A6. Here we assume that A commute with P and that (E − P )A = 0
(that is A = PA = AP ). We have to show that U(A|P ) is equal to U(A). But U(A|P ) =
Tr(APBP ) = Tr(PAPB) = Tr(AB) = U(A), because PAP = A.
Proof of Assertion b). To proof it, we define (for an arbitrary Q-lottery σ =
∑
i xi ⊗ Pi
and an event W given by a projector P ) some special (adapted to P ) Q-lottery that we
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denote adW (σ). Roughly speaking, adW (σ) =
∑
i xi⊗PPiP . However, the sum
∑
i PPiP is
equal to P , not to E. Therefore we add to this sum a tail-end x∗ ⊗ (E − P ). Here x∗ is a
prize with zero utility. The final formula yields
adW (σ) =
∑
i
xi ⊗ PPiP + x∗ ⊗ (E − P ).
Lemma 3. a) σ|W = adW (σ)|W ;
b) the adapted lottery adW (σ) is compatible with P ;
c) for any Q-lottery σ we have adW (σ)|W⊥ = x∗ ⊗ (E − P ).
Proof. a) It is obvious that Pi|W = PPiP |W . Moreover, (E − P )|W = P (E − P ) = 0.
b) For any i we have PPPiP = PPiPP , since PP = P . Moreover, P (E − P ) =
(E − P )P = 0.
c) It is clear that (E − P )PPiP = 0 for any i. ✷
Proposition 4. Suppose that a preference relation W on the set QL(H) is a weak
order and satisfies the axioms A5 and A6. Then it is given by the following explicit formula
(where σ and τ are Q-lotteries on H):
σ W τ if and only if adW (σ)  adW (τ). (1)
Indeed, due to the axiom A5 and Lemma 3, we have σ ≈W adW (σ) and τ ≈W adW (τ).
Applying axiom A6 to the lotteries adW (σ) and adW (τ) (which is possible due to points 2)
and 3) of Lemma 3), we obtain that adW (σ)  adW (τ) if and only if adW (σ) W adW (τ).
The rest follows from the transitivity of W . ✷
There remains to recall that (unconditional) utility of lottery adW (σ) is equal toTr(Sh(adW (σ))B).
If A = Sh(σ) then Sh(adW (σ)) = PAP + 0(E − P ) = PAP . Therefore U(adW (σ)) =
Tr(PAPB) = Tr(APBP ) = Tr(PBP )Tr(ABup), what is (up to the factor Tr(PBP )) the
utility of σ with respect to ‘updated’ belief operator Bup = PBP/Tr(PBP ). This completes
the proof of Theorem 2.
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Appendix 4. Proof of Proposition 1.
We here prove an assertion that generalizes Propostion 1 as we substitute projector P with
an arbitrary ‘fuzzy-projector’ F , that is an operator 0 ≤ F ≤ E (see Remark 4 of Section
4). The posterior Bup is given as
√
FB
√
F/Tr(
√
FB
√
F ) =
√
FB
√
F/Tr(FB). We shall
denote it as B|F .
Proposition 1′. The distance between a prior B and the posterior B|F is O((1 −
Tr(FB))1/4).
In other words, if ε = 1−Tr(FB) then the distance between B and B|F is O(ε1/4).
Proof. Choose an orthonormal basis of H in which the operator F (as well as
√
F ) has
diagonal form
F = diag(f1, ..., fn).
In this basis operator B is represented by Hermitian matrix (bij), where i and j run over 1 to
n = dimH . The matrix
√
FB
√
F has coefficients
√
fibij
√
fj . The matrix
√
FB
√
F differs
of B|F = √FB√F/Tr(FB) by less than O(ε). Thus we need to compare B and √FB√F
and to show that the distance between them is O(ε1/4). Or equivalenetly we need to show
that (for any i and j) distance between bij and
√
fibij
√
fj is O(ε
1/4) .
Let us divide the set of indices i from {1, ..., n} into two groups. Say that an index i is
non-essential, if bii ≤
√
ε, and is essential in the opposite case.
Lemma 4. If i is non-essential then |bij | ≤ ε1/4.
Proof. A sub-matrix of the matrix B, formed by the rows and columns from the set
{i, j}, is Hermitian and therefore has non-negative determinant biibjj − |bij|2. That is
√
ε ≥
biibij ≥ |bij|2. ✷
Due to Lemma A, if i or j is non-essential then the coefficient bij of the matrix B as well
as the corresponding coefficient bij
√
fi
√
fj of the matrix
√
FB
√
F is ≤ ε1/4. Therefore the
distance between them is ≤ 2ε1/4.
Hence we can suppose that the both indexes i and j are essential.
Lemma 5. If an index i is essential then fi = 1 +O(ε
1/2).
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Proof. We have Tr(FB) = 1 − ε, that is ∑i fibii = 1 − ε. Moreover the trace of B is
equal to 1, that is
∑
i bii = 1. Subtracting we obtain that
∑
i bii(1− fi) = ε, therefore each
term of this sum is less or equal to ε, bii(1 − fi) ≤ ε. . In particular, if i is essential then
bii > ε
1/2 and 1− fi < ε1/2, that is fi = 1 +O(ε1/2). ✷
As a corollary we obtain (for an essential i) that
√
fi = 1 +O(ε
1/2).
Let us return to evaluation of the distance between bij and bij
√
fi
√
fj in the case when i
and j are essential indexes. It is clear that bij−bij
√
fi
√
fj = bij(1−(1+O(ε1/2))(1+O(ε1/2))).
The module of this number is no more than |bij| (which is ≤ 1) multiplied by Q(ε1/2).
Therefore the distance is no more than ≤ O(ε1/2) ≤ O(ε1/4) which proves Proposition 1‘. ✷
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